Westernisation or modernisation

Westernisation or modernisation


The modernisation of Indian society was a matter of concern for those who assumed power when the country became independent more than 50 years ago. The intelligentsia, as a whole, viewed modernisation with favour if not enthusiasm. This was true not only of India but of newly-independent countries throughout the world. Decolonisation was viewed as an opportunity not for a return to the past but for a more effective and meaningful participation in the modern world. It was tacitly assumed that some countries had travelled further along the road to modernity than others but that the others too could and should catch up with the former.

The modernisation of society was regarded as not only desirable for its own sake but also as a precondition for the development of the economy and the advance of democracy. Economic development was an urgent task in a country in which poverty and stagnation were widespread. Much of the blame for the poor state of the economy was laid at the door of colonial rule. With the removal of that constraint, the road to economic development seemed wide open. But there were internal constraints as well in the form of age-old social habits, practices, customs and institutions. In the newly-independent countries of Asia and Africa, the obstacles to economic growth were not only technological, they were also institutional. The removal of those obstacles or the modernisation of society was thus viewed as essential for growth and development.

The advance of democracy also required some recasting of traditional social arrangements. Indeed, the idea of `political development' soon took its place by the side of economic development. The creation of democracy did not stop with the adoption of adult franchise and the holding of regular elections, important as they were. It required effective political socialisation and political participation, in short, education in citizenship.

The impulse for modernisation came from many different sources and not just from the requirements of economic development and democratic politics. In the wake of Independence, Indians looked forward to participating in the modern world as free and equal members. The political leadership under Jawaharlal Nehru was modernist and not traditionalist. Independence created new opportunities for breaking free from the cobwebs of the past. The Indian middle class wanted a modern and not a traditional education for its children. The urge for a modern, not to say a western, education for their children has expanded and intensified among middle class families in the last 50 years.

The seeds of modernisation along with those of democracy and development, were planted in Indian soil during the colonial rule. Independence and decolonisation brought in new elements and new configurations, but at least in India they did not lead to a complete break with the immediate past. Neither Nehru, the first Prime Minister, nor B. R. Ambedkar, the main architect of the Constitution, wanted such a break; and even Sardar Patel threw in his weight in favour of retaining the ICS, till then regarded as the steel frame of imperial rule.

Attitudes to modernity and modernisation have changed between the middle of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. Fifty years ago, the modernists held the field because the traditionalists spoke in a weak voice and post-modernism was yet to be born. There are various reasons why modernisation has lost some of the appeal it once enjoyed. First, as the process unfolded its social costs became more and more apparent, and to some at least they seemed to outweigh its benefits. In some areas and in certain phases it tends to increase rather than reduce the gap between the socially advantaged and the disadvantaged. Second, certain homogenising tendencies inherent in modernisation make it appear as a perpetual threat to the social and cultural identity of the nation as a whole. The prophets of doom declare that modernisation will rob Indian society and culture or its identity and yet leave Indians far behind on the path of progress.

Apprehensions of loss of identity are not easy to dispel; one can at best try to see that they do not assume pathological forms. In its origin and evolution, the idea of modernisation has been tied inextricably to that of westernisation: that has been the poisoned chalice for many ardent nationalists who want their country to progress. Many might like to subscribe to modernisation but they would not like to submit to western hegemony. Is it possible to have a modernity that will be completely untainted by any association with western ideas and values?

In an important study of the Arab world conducted just after decolonisation began, Daniel Lerner spoke by preference of modernisation rather than westernisation. He explained his preference by saying his Arab readers would be more comfortable with the first than with the second. They welcomed modernisation but were deeply ambivalent towards the West.

In his Tagore lectures barely a decade later, M. N. Srinivas decided to face the issue squarely and chose `westernisation' instead of `modernisation'. He pointed to the complexity of westernisation and to the depth of its penetration in Indian society. Although it had spread widely, its spread was not uniform. It started during colonial rule, but the end of colonial rule did not bring westernisation to an end. Rather, as Srinivas noted, "the process has become greatly intensified, in many ways, since 1947 when India became independent." Further, there was, according to him, a change in the motive force by which the process was driven. In the 19th century, the desire for social reform took precedence over the urge for national freedom, but the priorities became reversed in the course of time.

Srinivas' account of social change in modern India, published in the mid-1960s, is remarkable for its depth of historical insight and its freedom from ideological cant. He gave the due share of credit to British rule but did not fail to point out that the British generally acted in their own interest, which was not always the interest of their Indian subjects. Nor did he believe that "the mindless imitation of the West" was all that there was to the process of westernisation. Although by no means uncritically admiring of India's modernising elite, he gave its members credit for their capacity for adaptation and innovation.

Indian society has moved too far along the road to modernity for it to be able to turn back now or even to stay at a standstill. No society can today opt out of the modern world without doing irreparable harm to itself. Being part of the modern world means remaining open to influences from all around. There will be blind imitation, no matter how much we deplore it; but there will also be intelligent adaptation as there has been in the past. Too much anxiety about the loss of identity and authenticity puts the brakes on a society's natural growth process.
Modernisation has not led all societies to become carbon copies - or caricatures - of any one society, and is unlikely to do so in the future. The modern world allows choices to be made, but the choices are not unrestricted. There are those who say that the modernity that emerged in the West in the wake of Enlightenment is irredeemably flawed, and that we should turn our back on it and create our own alternative modernity. That would be a vain and hopeless pursuit. Modernisation is not like a bus which one boards as one chooses and from which one alights as one pleases.